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Abstract. As pundits discuss the causes and results of the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing 
Great Recession, economists of various strands—led mainly by Keynesians—are slowly 
beginning to question the supposed wisdom of unfettered markets. Since Keynesian-liberal 
disputes revolve around the symptoms of the crisis rather than the historical and structural 
features of market economies, we thought that a Hayek-Polanyi comparison would be a 
timely intervention in order to understand the real nature of the subject. This comparison 
may also pave the way for the creation of an alternative to the vagaries of unfettered 
markets. 
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1. Introduction 
ive years on from the official end of the Great Recession, most of the world 
economy is still in disarray in terms of growth numbers and prospects of 
opportunities to spur further private investment. While those of the neo-
liberal creed have been hapless in explaining the reasons for the crisis and in 
offering solutions, the Keynesian economists' formula of monetary stimulus 
to reinvigorate demand through quantitative easing has created a bleak picture, and 
left the most notable of Keynesians discussing the probabilities of secular 
stagnation in the near future.  
At this juncture, it is opportune to return to the historical debate between two 
great figures of political economy, namely Friedrich Hayek and Karl Polanyi, since 
the above-mentioned disputes between neo-liberals and Keynesians generally 
accept the market economy and its associated institutions as given in a trans-
historical manner. From that premise, one may argue that since the days of F. 
Hayek, the concept of free markets has gradually become a new dogma in the 
science of economics. Furthermore, as most pundits, and especially Keynesians, 
question the nature of economics and its methods in a lurid critique of self-
regulating markets, it is only fitting that Karl Polanyi's arguments regarding the 
historical context that created the market economy, and his methods that delve into 
the inter-subjective construction of economic institutions, should come to the fore 
again.  In contrasting these two influential figures, we wish to emphasize the fact 
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there are, in fact, alternatives which can fundamentally alter the nature of the main 
disputes in political economy today.   
 
2. The Hayek-Polanyi Dispute 
The main factor distinguishing these two powerful figures of the 1940s and „50s 
from each other was the methodology they adopted in describing the nature of 
social phenomena. While Hayek was a methodological individualist, Polanyi was 
what Erik Olin Wright called an anti-reductionist. Hayek defined the burden of 
historical structures on social relations as historicism, but for Polanyi, historicism 
and the historical context shaping the individual and social lives of human beings 
were the utmost explanatory factors in social sciences.  
The methodological individualism that underpinned so many of Hayek‟s 
arguments asserts that in explaining events around us, social categories may be 
reduced to micro categories or individualist foundations, and at the same time 
rejects any explanatory power of social categories independent of individuals and 
their intra-relations (Wright, Levine, & Sober, 1992). As in  description of the price 
mechanism in market economy and how prices are the ultimate expressions of the 
individual psychologies of market participants, or in his refutation of the feasibility 
of central planning because of the impossibility of gathering all required data 
regarding individual positions, his methodological individualist epistemology 
usually prioritizes the action and intentions of actors. It must be remembered here 
that, since Weber‟s time, most followers of this method have stressed that this is an 
entirely neutral form of explanation, and not value-loaded (Weber, 1922). This is 
fully is in line with Hayek's rejection of  use of collective actors in his explanation 
since, according to Weber, only an individual's mental reasoning can be learned 
clearly and correlates with objective knowledge of events. In Hayek, this individual 
action oriented understanding has a dual use, he not only emphasized the priority of 
human intentions in describing social life, but also argued that the existence of 
millions of different perspectives regarding the same phenomena shows the 
limitations of the individual's capabilities in rational actions (Hayek, 1941). Thus, 
individualism usually react to what they experienced in their immediate 
environment rather than gather  all forms of information related to their future 
actions, which, according to Hayek,  renders central planning and huge collective 
rational decisions useless, and indeed dangerous for human society (Hayek, 1941). 
Another point regarding Hayek's individualist methodology is his idea of 
spontaneous order, which is in line with the limitation of individual reasoning 
confronted with these multifarious signals. He, asserted that the success of the 
market as an institution is its open-ended form shaped by the unintended actions of 
individual subjects. This idea was clearly an extension of Newtonian physics and 
its explanation of nature without the intervention of humans, for Hayek, if there are 
spontaneous mechanisms at work in nature‟s evolution, then the same is applicable 
to human societies (Hayek, 1979).  
However, the subject of market is something entirely different for Karl Polanyi. 
Despite his differences from Marxists, Polanyi shared the idea that neither 
economy nor the institution of the market were governed by a spontaneous, 
machine-like order. They are completely subject to malleability throughout time, 
and entirely influenced by social conventions and norms (Polanyi, 1944). 
Historicism, or the specific historical context from which the market emerged, may 
only be understood through a combination of structural causes using the empirical 
findings of anthropology and history regarding human perceptions. Thus, this 
historicist explanation, while rejecting complete methodological holism, attributed 
some form of explanatory power to both collective level institutions and individual 
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decisions. One stark example of this in Polanyi was how he explained the collapse 
of the liberal capitalist order at the turn of the 20th century. Although the specific 
actions of individuals, firms and states had entirely different purposes like resisting 
ever-increasing commodification, hoarding over-accumulated profits, and trying to 
act within the rules of the gold standard all of them in combination destroyed the 
concept of self-regulating capitalism (Wright, Levine, & Sober, 1992). These 
arguments place Polanyi at the opposite pole to a methodological individualist like 
Hayek. At the same time, by not reducing all these factors to one all-encompassing 
cause, Polanyi defied the limitations and orthodoxy of structural holism, which, in 
the case of orthodox Marxism, explains human actions entirely through changes in 
the economic system.  
 
3. Hayek's ideas on Market and Society 
In his endeavor to defend the free markets and the concept of competition 
against supposed encroachments of government intervention and central planning 
on human freedom, and in line with his individualism, Hayek began with a 
rejection of any full comprehensibility of general social phenomena by the human 
mind (Hayek, 1979). That idea stemmed mainly from Hayek's thoughts on the 
capability of social science, and its inefficiencies relative to the scientific 
explanation of natural sciences. In his book Counter Revolution in Science, the 
observational areas of these two were contrasted by Hayek. He reached the 
conclusion that while the natural scientist has to identify the elements that make up 
the whole structure from an examination of the whole itself, this task is rendered 
nearly impossible in social sciences, since the subject matter, society, is not a 
whole but a consequence entirely of the unintended actions of individuals that 
make up the society. What social science can do at best is to arrive at 
an approximate reality heavily bounded by human perceptions of that reality (ibid). 
According to Hayek, given the complex and varying actions of multitudes of 
people, the suggestion that the natural science method is applicable in reaching an 
understanding of human societies with all those different views and interpretations, 
is wrong, and indeed dangerous, since data required for that enormous task is 
impossible to gather in the first place. This would be a harbinger of what he had to 
say on the impossibility of central planning in socialism. He further argued that as 
the appropriate objects of social science are the opinions and intentions of human 
beings, and these exist in dispersed, incomplete and inconsistent forms, then any 
attempt to pretend that this imperfect knowledge is an objective fact of human 
societies would mire the researcher in constant errors. Since knowing that totality 
is impossible, social science should take individual perceptions and action as 
the founding source of all uncomprehended and unintended human institutions 
(Hayek, 1979). 
Another fault Hayek cited in his critique of scientism was that social scientists 
take provisional theories constructed by the popular mind as facts that explain 
relations among individual phenomena. For Hayek, wholes are never under 
observation, and treating them as social beings or attributing to them 
human characteristics was another of scientism‟s obsessions. Statistical 
information that humans try to gather to understand social institutions does not, in 
fact, reveal any knowledge about the real properties of individual elements that 
make up the whole. Given the human mind‟s inefficiencies in gathering all 
necessary information regarding the social whole, it is simply 
another erroneous attempt to extract historical knowledge simply by observing 
certain aspects of that totality in a given spatio-temporal limit (Hayek, 1941). 
Hence, Hayek argued, historical knowledge is often relative and contradictory. As 
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opposed to that method, pragmatic explanations that progress from individual 
human actions may be more successful in clarifying the reasons behind unintended 
outcomes, i.e. most social institutions. Since Hayek believed these institutions are 
largely the unintended outcomes of separate individual actions, human efforts to 
redesign or control these unintended outcomes would severely constrain human 
freedom.  
Another point of contention for him was what he described as the teleological 
and uni-linear understanding of the development trajectory of human societies 
(Hayek, 1941). In particular, Marxist arguments regarding changing forms of 
production and level of development from primitive societies to slavery, from 
feudalism to capitalism and the eventual socialist project was the most striking 
example of this understanding of history. As with his thoughts on social totalities, 
he adamantly opposed the idea that history has such a mission, and also accused 
Marxists of reading too much into a given episode of human society and rendering 
this into historical facts (Hayek, 2011).   
What made Hayek an individualist was the influence on him of the ideas of 
earlier German and Austrian philosophers and thinkers on human perceptions and 
the mind. Like Leibniz, German idealists, focused on human mind and 
metaphysical harmony that precedes materialist actions. Or, for example, Leibniz's 
thought on monads, that act independently of each other, and which mean that 
the intrinsic properties of objects are always superseded by relational properties in 
ontological questions, since he, Leibniz, took them as mirrors of universe and 
complete subjects in themselves (Stanford Encyclopedia, 2012). Alan 
Ebenstein wrote that Hayek was also influenced by Carl Menger's theory of value, 
which established human perception as the main determinant of value rather than 
objective measurements of labor etc. (Ebenstein, 2003). Austrian economist 
Wieser followed on from Menger, and invented concepts of marginal utility, which 
assigned values to human perception rather than material inputs to the production 
system. All of these Austrian economists' ideas found their place in Hayek's 
thoughts on markets and society (Ebenstein, 2003).   
In line with those individualistic thinkers and the association of their ideas, 
Hayek wrote his major work Road to Serfdom in the mid-1940s. This was his 
response to the increasing influence of Keynesian and socialist thoughts on planned 
economy, which was in ascendance then as a radical alternative to the free markets. 
The period during which Hayek penned his defense of markets 
against encroachments, the 1930s and „40s, were chaotic both economically and 
politically and full of uncertainties as the rise of totalitarianism in both East and 
West engulfed the concept of liberal democracy. He was particularly concerned 
with Nazism in Germany and Stalinism in the Soviet Union, both of which he 
branded as collectivist economy in Road to Serfdom. Rather than looking at the 
historically specific structures of those two countries and delving deep into 
discussion of differing property relations, Hayek chose to place these two countries 
in the same basket, since from his perspective both formed an existential threat to 
human freedom (i.e. Western liberalism). Their social and historical variations 
were of little importance to him. Like the 17th century English philosopher 
Hobbes, who wrote Leviathan during the troubling times of the English civil war, 
Hayek was under the impression that the social institutions of World War II were 
harbingers of a pessimistic future (Hayek, 1976). Thus, these institutions 
symbolized trans-historical truths regarding the nature of central planning and non-
market interventions in the economy. Yet here we see his diagnoses about the 
nature of central planning within that time frame actually contradicting his own 
method, since, in his earlier work, he had accused scientism of trying to extract a 
general truth about society by observing just a short period of history (Hayek, 
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1976). Here, one can assert that Hayek's misinterpretation of historicism was some 
form of teleological understanding of historical development, in which 
successive developmental stages of human societies follow on from each other 
with history having a Hegelian mission, and his methodological individualism 
misguidedly led him to erroneous conclusions.   
On the subject of competition, Hayek professed that not only was it the most 
efficient way to allocate resources known to humanity up to that point, but that it 
also gave individuals the chance to measure the risks and advantages of their 
economic choices. Having these qualities, competition was a crucial part of liberal 
freedoms, as it did not require a conscious human design or intervention in the 
private life of individuals in the process of realizing its largely spontaneous 
benefits. With this assertion, Hayek cleverly ignored power differences among 
various actors with different access to resources, thus enabling himself to consider 
all interventions in market relationships as forms of coercion (Hayek, 1976). 
Though he supported some legal limitations—especially against the exploitation of 
ignorance—he forgot the fact that some commercial activities were direct examples 
of that exploitation (all arbitrage gains coming from geographical and 
communication limits in markets). On the issue of competition and monopoly 
relationship, Hayek took a detour from the entire history of the production process, 
and blamed the state's cooperation with these large private firms for restricting 
competition (Hayek, 1976). By stripping these two institutions, state and private 
monopolies, from their social origins, Hayek formed a moral defense against 
distortions to the free market. However, from a critical perspective, one may be 
curious about the formation process of these monopolies within the free markets, as 
they were not institutions created overnight. During their formative years, all the 
giants firms made precise use of their structural power in the market to accumulate 
more resources, in line with the general requirements of capitalist competition. 
Besides, private monopolies' relations with the state at the point of restricting 
competition overlooks the  structural power of capital in shaping political 
institutions through codifying tax and other legal frameworks. Hayek's writings 
treated the issue as if the state remained a neutral observer on the sidelines until a 
certain threshold was breached by private firms, although this threshold is itself 
hard to establish: Who determines how much market share by a certain firm 
constitutes a threat to competition? 
As far as central planning is concerned, Hayek dismissed the idea from the start 
by emphasizing the inescapable problem of coordination among millions of 
individual decisions. He stressed that if we protect the basic liberties of citizens and 
respect their life decisions, then it follows that no group of people or institution 
may have the ability to predict the outcomes of all those millions of separate 
actions (Hayek, 1976). Though this line of thinking seems like a valid argument at 
first, a closer look reveals that it completely ignores developing levels of 
communication and the social nature of economic decisions. Even the price system, 
so adored by Hayek for its ability to coordinate competition and economic 
behavior, is not an isolated phenomenon: it has a social dimension and requires 
communicative practices. As a relevant note, he further criticized central planning 
as necessitating almost complete agreement in all walks of life for a definite action 
to be taken to arrive at common ends. For Hayek, this complexity inevitably forces 
central planning to delegate decision-making powers to an elite group of 
autonomous bodies (Hayek, 1976). He completely dismissed the possibility of a 
planning mechanism springing from and supervised on the local level, which seems 
ironic these days, as neo-liberal free market defenders espouse, more than any 
other tendency, the technical management of economy isolated from political 
pressures.   
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On page 80 of Road to Serfdom, Hayek professed that in central planning, the 
state ceases to be utilitarian machinery intended to help individuals towards the 
fullest development of their personality, and becomes instead a moral institution 
(Hayek, 1976), here meaning value-laden. Similarly to ordinary liberals or 
positivists, Hayek tended to see the state as a value-neutral body created to serve 
human needs, and therefore abstracted it from the specific historical processes from 
which it emerged. And he refuted the probable success of planning, as it must 
formally eliminate the rule of law in its target to increase the advantages of 
particular groups in society rather than being neutral towards all sectors, as in a 
liberal state. 
As the global financial crisis spurs doubts regarding the viability of the free 
market, I have tried throughout this essay to come to an understanding of the 
philosophical and social origins of Hayek's ideas on markets and society. A 
possible conclusion is that his individualistic approach to the subject missed quite a 
few points ranging from historicity of market relations to the social nature of 
communication that underpins the power of price and competition. Hence, the 
second part of this study will lead the reader to his rival, Karl Polanyi, and his take 
on what constituted the origins of market economies and questioning of whether or 
not they were really an extension of natural human tendencies.         
 
4. Polanyi's ideas on Market and Society 
Karl Polanyi and Friedrich Hayek were born in the Austrian Hungarian Empire, 
and their most influential respective works, The Great Transformation: the 
political and economic origins of our time and Road to Serfdom were both 
published in 1944, while World War II still raged.  Despite this, they present to the 
world completely different views on economic order and state-market-society 
relations. Indeed, Polanyi‟s book provides one of the most important critiques of 
the liberal economic system supported by Hayek and many other scholars. In 
general terms, as mentioned earlier, liberal Hayek opposes state intervention in the 
market and claims that such intervention leads to loss of individual freedom, which 
from Hayek‟s perspective ultimately leads to tyranny. For Hayek and other liberals, 
all forms of protectionism are a mistake. The market can and does resolve 
problems which may arise. 
 In response to the Hayekian interpretation of unfettered markets as 
embodiments of freedom, Polanyi, in his research on the social consequences of 
this rising power of market economy in all walks of human life, pointed out that 
subordination of three crucial elements—land, labor and money—to the 
commoditization frenzy of markets leads to terrifying outcomes for human 
societies. He claimed that land, labor and money were produced and used strictly 
because of their natural use values, and unlike other manmade other commodities 
their marketization as another ordinary good endangers the social fabric and 
gradually undermines the well-being of human societies. Over-accumulation and 
consumption of land inevitably brings about environmental damage and pollution, 
while uncertainties involving the labor markets and the presence of large reserve 
labor, i.e. unemployment, bring with them bad working conditions, and constant 
market neglect of the needs of human psychology resulting in social dislocation. 
Thirdly, usage of money in speculative activities and sudden volatility in its supply 
and demand within market economies creates sudden collapse of companies or 
economic crises of the sort that has significant fallout for human social 
organization. Since Polanyi believed that a healthy society cannot bear these crisis-
prone tendencies, humans collectively introduce measures to cope with the 
vagaries of market economies.                  
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  As the markets gradually began to penetrate every sphere of life, Polanyi gave 
examples from history to support these ideas on the self-protection initiatives of 
societies. One of his chapter deals with the Speenhamland Laws, which were 
introduced in the late 18
th
 century and tried to create a scale to measure rural 
poverty and somehow prevent rural destitution from worsening. He argued that 
these kind of laws inherently refuted the logic of self-regulating markets in the 
early industrial revolution (Polanyi, 1944). Since then, other laws to protect 
agriculture and the prevent overuse of land resources of Europe all aimed to 
establish a protection mechanism around human society, without which market 
externalities could easily cripple a society‟s ability to feed itself through 
agriculture. Between 1870 and the inter-war era, measures such as minimum wage 
laws, New Deal policies, increasing unionization coupled with capital controls, and 
rising protectionism over industry also signified what Polanyi called double 
movement; a reaction to the ravages of the capitalist economy. In pointing out 
these historical tendencies, Polanyi not only proved that free markets are not the 
natural inclination of human societies, but that their operation and penetration into 
all fields of life require an external force, namely either states or giant companies‟ 
monopolistic controls. He further hinted at the relations of alienation under 
conditions of commodity fetishism which would ossify the human cooperation 
required to realize human freedom in the societal sense. 
Although initially published more than seventy years ago, The Great 
Transformation is still relevant and presents important arguments in understanding 
the current structure and functioning of political economy. Polanyi starts his 
analysis by describing the emergence of the modern economic system and stresses 
the role the Industrial Revolution played in its formation. The economic 
transformation witnessed in England forms the center of Polanyi‟s analysis. By 
focusing on economic history, he explains the evolution of capitalism and major 
dilemmas originated from this system.  
From Polanyi‟s perspective, state-market-society interactions must be 
reconciled, and the state has to protect society against the market by mediating the 
effects of the economy. In England, for example, the Speenhamland Laws were 
introduced to protect labor, and the state may protect different groups for different 
reasons. Hence, as Polanyi saw it, the general purpose of the state is protection of 
society from market effects. These arguments have found many supporters in many 
countries. Indeed, in parallel with Polanyi‟s argument, during the 20th century in 
different parts of the world, states did take several measures to protect their 
societies against the market‟s devastating effects. Such measures being taken by 
states entails political mobilization of the working class and the existence of a 
strong economy in which people can present their demands. Therefore, Polanyi, in 
presenting one of the most important critiques of liberalism, supports democratic 
politics where various segments of a society can express their wishes. In this 
respect, separation of politics and economics is not seen as natural, but rather 
perceived as an artificial situation where the goal is to make the state not interfere 
in the economy.  
Polanyi opposes a market economy which functions in a self-regulating system. 
In a market economy, production and distribution of goods, as well as prices of 
economic commodities, are determined within this self-regulating mechanism. For 
Polanyi, a market economy based on a self-regulating mechanism is not a natural 
phenomenon and it does emerge automatically. If the state does not interfere in the 
market economy to take protective measures, the society will eventually be 
destroyed. In Polanyi‟s words: 
[T]he idea of the self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an 
institution could not exist of nay length of time without annihilating the 
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human and natural substance of the society; it would have physically 
destroyed man and transformed its surroundings into a wilderness. Inevitably, 
society took measures to protect itself, but whatever measures it took 
impaired the self-regulation of the market, disorganized industrial life, and 
thus endangered society in yet another way. It was this dilemma which forced 
the development of the market system into a definite groove and finally 
disrupted the social organization based upon it (Polanyi, 1944; p.3-4). 
“Double movement” is the term used by Polanyi to describe the tension which 
arises as a result of state-economy-society interactions. At one end of this 
movement there is economic liberalism, which supports establishment of a self-
regulating market in which laissez-faire is the main principle. At the other end, 
however, lies social protection, arguing for applications of various protective 
measures against the effects of the market economy. While economic liberalism 
relies mainly on support from the trading classes, social protection is supported by 
those whose economic and social statuses are negatively affected by the market 
economy. In other words, the beginning of economic liberalism caused the 
formation of a countermovement of protectionism (Polanyi, 1944; p.132, 200).  
 
5. Double Movement:  Neo- Liberalism in the World 
Economy 
Even in our current era, where the world economy has reached to an 
unprecedented level of interconnectedness, it is possible to say that the double 
movement is still going on. People negatively affected by the globalizing world 
economy are calling on the state to intervene, for application of protective 
measures and sustainment of welfare systems. On the other hand, economic 
liberalism still has many supporters, especially powerful ones like the richest 
segments of societies and multinational corporations who prefer to carry out their 
operations in a border-free world economy. Since The Great Transformation was 
published in 1944, states have taken measures in line with social protection. In 
Western Europe in particular, states empowered welfare systems for the purpose of 
protecting the poorest segments of their societies and in order to halt the expansion 
of socialism in the post-World War II era.  
From the early 1980s onwards, with popularity of the Washington Consensus 
on the rise, the trend towards social protection was reversed. In this new era, 
economic liberalism gained in support and social protections measures began to 
gradually diminish. According to the policies introduced by the Consensus, “the 
role of the state in the economy should be drastically reduced and the economy 
should be opened to the outside world […] governments should deregulate and 
privatize the economy” (Gilpin, 2001; p.315). Indeed this was the prescription 
given by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to all less developed countries 
(LDCs) and any country on the lookout for international funds was required to 
obey.  
In the post-World War II era, the IMF and the World Bank (WB) became the 
main pioneering institutions of the new liberal world economy. With failure in the 
foundation of an International Trade Organization, a new formula was developed 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) went into effect in 1948. 
In its first years, GATT did not overly concern itself with the worries of LDCs, and 
was viewed as “a rich man‟s club” by the latter. This perception of GATT meant 
that during the 1950s most of its members happened to be developed countries with 
LDCs taking little, if any, part in its negotiations. One of the main purposes of the 
IMF, WB and GATT was liberalization of the world economy by pulling down any 
barriers on the path to international trade. In the 1960s, LDCs were able to form a 
strong opposition to the international trade system proposed by these international 
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financial institutions and they formed the Group Seventy-Seven (G-77) (Spero & 
Hart, 1997; p.216, 221-222). The G-77 argued that while free international trade 
may very well provide some absolute gains to LDCs, they would gain nothing in 
relative terms compared to developed countries (Gilpin, 1987; p.276). By the end 
of the 1970s, although LDCs‟ calls for a fairer international trade order continued, 
their influence decreased (Spero & Hart, 1997; p.230), and by the 1980s the 
Washington Consensus had become the dominant paradigm in international trade. 
The GATT remained the primary tool of promoting liberal international trade until 
1995 when it was incorporated with the World Trade Organization (WTO). With 
emergence of the WTO, the pressure for liberalization of international trade 
reached an unprecedented level. As an international organization, the WTO shares 
the GATT‟s goal of reducing trade barriers, but instead of being based on an 
agreement, its authority and responsibilities are broader than the GATT. However, 
are we living in a borderless world where goods, capital and people move freely? 
In fact, the world we live in now is not as “global” as these pro-liberal institutions 
would have us believe. What Polanyi wrote more than seventy years ago is still 
relevant when describing the international political economy: 
[S]ince the 1870s an emotional change was noticeable though there was no 
corresponding break in the dominant ideas. The world continued to believe in 
internationalism and interdependence, while acting on the impulses of 
nationalism and self-sufficiency. Liberal nationalism was developing into 
national liberalism, with its market leanings towards protectionism and 
imperialism abroad, monopolistic conservatism at home (Polanyi, 1944; 
p.198). 
In the contemporary word economy, it is no secret that liberal trade policies are 
promoted by developed countries and that these mostly work to their advantage. 
Neither is it a secret that even as they use the various international financial 
institutions such as the IMF and WB to impose these policies on the LDCs, they 
themselves do not adhere to them. When differences among countries are taken 
into account, forcing all LDCs to follow the same set of policies clearly does not 
promote development, but this has been the IMF policy toward LDCs for a long 
time. Forcing states to follow policies that do not fit with their economic and social 
structures does not contribute to these countries‟ development efforts. It simply 
causes existing problems to become more entrenched. Contrary to the promises of 
the Washington Consensus, in the era when these policies have been most widely 
imposed on LDCs, as Lant Pritchett argues, “[f]ar from narrowing, the gap between 
the incomes of the rich and poor countries has grown markedly and is likely to 
widen further.” (Pritchett, 1996; p.40). Despite the fact that a shift has taken place 
from social protection to economic liberalism in many parts of the world, double 
movement is still going on in our current era and Polanyi continues to provide great 
assistance to us in understanding the tension between economic liberalism and 
social protection. 
 
6. Societal Responses to Neo-Liberalism 
From Polanyi‟s perspective, contrary to an artificial and unhistorical self-
regulating market, protectionism is a natural phenomenon, arising out of the need 
to protect society from the effects of the market. The demands for social protection, 
according to Polanyi, are not peculiar to specific classes but may arise from various 
segments of society. On class interests, Polanyi goes further and argues that they 
do not provide satisfactory explanations in explaining long-term social processes. 
For him, the class interest approach contains many fallacies, and he considers the 
interests of a class to be “primarily not economic but social.” Since the social 
interests of different segments of a society are negatively affected by the market, 
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people from different segments combine their power to meet threats caused by the 
market. Placing too much emphasis on economic interests leads to neglect of social 
interests. “Social exploitations” like “cultural degeneration” caused by market 
forces usually take place in parallel with “economic exploitation”. (Polanyi, 1944; 
p.152-157).  
On the process of formation of states, Polanyi emphasizes the role of the 
working class, who according to him played an important role. The process of the 
French Revolution helping the bourgeoisie in their war against feudalism also 
served to help the working class to gain class consciousness and put forward its 
demands at the political level. As a result, the European working class won 
protection of various forms against the market economy‟s negative effects 
(Polanyi, 1944; p.174-176).  
Treating factors of production, labor, land and capital as commodities endangers 
society. In arguing that no segment of society is immune to the negative effects of 
market economy, Polanyi tells us that just as the working class and various other 
segments need protection against the effects of a self-regulating market, so too do 
capital-owning rich business people. To try and secure this kind of protection, 
according to Polanyi, mechanisms such as central banks were introduced. Although 
protectionist movements for labor, land and capital were seen in different ways and 
on different scales, they were all caused by “impaired self-regulation of the 
market” which in turn led to “political intervention” (Polanyi, 1944; p.174-176, 
203, 206).  
Indeed, civilization as a whole is under threat from the self-regulating market. 
The goal of increasing material welfare puts society in peril. Any method of 
intervention “must obstruct the mechanism of the self-regulating market” (Polanyi, 
1944; p.219, 231). For Polanyi, the market system looms so threateningly that it 
even lay at the root of the emergence of Fascism in many countries in the twentieth 
century, with crisis in the market system leading to the appearance of such regimes. 
Recognizing the danger emanating from the market system, newly-emerging fascist 
and socialist regimes discarded the principles of laissez-faire (Polanyi, 1944; 
p.242). Currently, we can see societal reactions against this neo-liberalism and 
unfettered market hegemony in the manner of Polanyi‟s double movement in 
Greece and Spain. With political parties Syrizia and Podemos in Greece and Spain 
respectively garnering their political support on a platform questioning the wisdom 
of neoliberals‟ austerity recipes in the aftermath of the Great Recession, cracks 
have begun to appear in the foundations of the free market idea, although the 
medium-term results of these parties‟ challenges remain to be seen. In the UK and 
France too, the respective extreme right platforms of the UKIP and Le Pen‟s 
National Front can be counted as challenges to the economic hardships associated 
with unfettered markets. As yet, these contestations of neo-liberalism and 
capitalisms failures have not brought any natural end to the system, a reminder to 
us again that actual organized societal intervention is required to create an 
alternative system. Thus, these processes further falsify the Hayekian notion of 
methodological individualism and spontaneous order, while strengthening 
Polanyi‟s position on conceptual frameworks such as institutional embeddedness 
and double movement.     
 
7. Conclusion 
As world economies struggle with negative developments from low growth and 
higher unemployment to financial bubbles, the future of the market economy and 
whether it can provide a sustainable way out of the present turmoil is coming 
increasingly under question.  Hayekian liberals and Keynesian economists are the 
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most vocal protagonists in the disputes. Throughout this essay, we have tried to 
prove that markets and their economic effects are neither natural to nor harmonious 
with human nature. On the one hand, we looked at the Hayekian perception of the 
market, the perspective which sees it as a natural and spontaneous extension of 
individual decisions in our society. We then explored Polanyi‟s approach, which 
examines the issue of the market from an opposite angle and through the lens of 
history. He argues that unnatural tendencies to commodify in market economies are 
inevitably confronted by a strong reaction from society, mostly in the form of state 
interventions. 
In our comparison, it is revealed that while Hayek used methodological 
individualism, and largely perceived the world ahistorically as an accumulation of 
spontaneous human actions, Polanyi objected to this depiction of reality and 
reminded us of the non-commodified nature of pre-capitalist societies, in which gift 
giving, solidarity etc. were the main determinants of human relationships. Polanyi 
added that it was only after certain historical conditions were met and through the 
unnatural support of the state and certain classes that market economy and 
commodity exchange became the all-powerful determinant of human social 
relationships. 
From the Speenhamland laws of the late 18
th
 century to the recent Syriza victory 
in elections in Greece, one can see that Polanyi's understanding of societal reaction 
to protect itself from market vagaries of markets has been happening, albeit in 
different forms and societal conditions. These societal reactions can be classified as 
what Polanyi called double movement, and they have become much more 
significant in the aftermath of the 2008 Great Recession. Thus, at this historical 
nexus and amidst disputes among pro-market liberal and Keynesian economists on 
potential solutions to the crisis, a timely comparison of Hayek and Polanyi is a 
breath of fresh air that helps scatter the illusions of the free markets that they are 
the natural outcomes of ordinary human action. 
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